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Dynamic Incentives, Occupational Choice, and the American Dream

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Author Info
Ghatak, M.
Morelli, M.
Sjostrom, T.

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Abstract

This paper introduces an overlapping generations model of the principal-agent problem. all individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Bargaining power and incentive contracts in the principle-agent relationships are determined by market forces.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number 1-00-1.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:pensta:1-00-1

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Postal: PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY PARK PENNSYLVANIA 16802 U.S.A.
Phone: (814)865-1456
Fax: (814)863-4775
Web page: http://econ.la.psu.edu/
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Related research
Keywords: MORAL HAZARD ; GENERATIONS ; INFORMATION ; LABOUR ; INCENTIVES;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

Cited by:
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  1. Maitreesh Ghatak & Nien-Huei Jiang, 2000. "A Simple Model of Inequality, Occupational Choice, and Development," Working Papers 0007, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Huw Lloyd-Ellis, 2003. "On the Impact of Inequality on Productivity Growth in the Short and Long Term: A Synthesis," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 29(s1), pages 65-86, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Dilip Mookherjee, 1999. "Contractual Constraints on Firm Performance in Developing Countries," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 98, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-10-24.

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