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Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions

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Author Info
Philip E. Berger
Eli Ofek
David Yermack

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Abstract

We study associations between managerial entrenchment and firms' capital structures, with results generally suggesting that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid debt. In a cross-sectional analysis, we find that leverage levels are lower when CEOs do not face pressure from either ownership and compensation incentives or active monitoring. In an analysis of leverage changes, we find that leverage increases in the aftermath of entrenchment-reducing shocks to managerial security, including unsuccessful tender offers, involuntary CEO replacements, and the addition to the board of major stockholders.

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File URL: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~sbrown/working/yermack/capstruc.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business- in its series New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires with number 96-14.

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Date of creation: Dec 1996
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Handle: RePEc:fth:nystfi:96-14

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Postal: U.S.A.; New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics . 44 West 4th Street. New York, New York 10012-1126
Web page: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/finance/
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