Warlord Competition

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Warlord Competition

Author Info

Skaperdas, S.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Stergios Skaperdas

Abstract

Warlords complete for turf that provides them with rents and "taxable" resources while also providing a semblance of security within their respective territories. Because such competition takes place through the use of force or the threat of the use of force, more competition can lead to lower welfare as resources are wasted on unproductive arming and fighting. Rents crowd out production, in some cases almost cmpletely so.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by California Irvine - School of Social Sciences in its series Papers with number 00-01-20.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:calirv:00-01-20

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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A.

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Related research
Keywords: TAXATION ; COMPETITION ; RENT ; PRODUCTION;

Other versions of this item:

Paper
- Skaperdas, Stergios, 2001. "Warlord Competition," Working Papers UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER). [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
E23 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Production
D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Capital and Total Factor Productivity; Capacity

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