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Monotonicity Implies Strategy-Proofness For Correspondences

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Author Info
Klaus Nehring
Abstract

We show that Maskin monotone social choice correspondences on sufficiently rich domains satisfy a generalized strategy-proofness property, thus generalizing Muller and Satterthwaite's (1977) theorem to correspondences.

From the point of view of Nash implementation theory, the result yields a partial characterization of the restrictions entailed by Nash implementability. Alternatively, the result can be viewed as a possibility theorem on the dominant-strategy-implementability of monotone SCCs via set-valued mechanisms for agents who are completely ignorant about the finally selected outcome. It is shown by examples that stronger strategy-proofness properties fail easily.

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Paper provided by California Davis - Department of Economics in its series Department of Economics with number 98-02.

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Handle: RePEc:fth:caldec:98-02

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