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Did bankruptcy reform cause mortgage default rates to rise?

Author

Listed:
  • Wenli Li
  • Michelle J. White
  • Ning S. Zhu

Abstract

This paper argues that the U.S. bankruptcy reform of 2005 played an important role in the mortgage crisis and the current recession. When debtors file for bankruptcy, credit card debt and other types of debt are discharged - thus loosening debtors' budget constraints. Homeowners in financial distress can therefore use bankruptcy to avoid losing their homes, since filing allows them to shift funds from paying other debts to paying their mortgages. But a major reform of U.S. bankruptcy law in 2005 raised the cost of filing and reduced the amount of debt that is discharged. The authors argue that an unintended consequence of the reform was to cause mortgage default rates to rise. Using a large dataset of individual mortgages, they estimate a hazard model to test whether the 2005 bankruptcy reform caused mortgage default rates to rise. Their major result is that prime and subprime mortgage default rates rose by 14 percent and 16 percent, respectively, after bankruptcy reform. The authors also use difference-in-difference to examine the effects of three provisions of bankruptcy reform that particularly harmed homeowners with high incomes and/or high assets and find that the default rates of affected homeowners rose even more. Overall, they calculate that bankruptcy reform caused the number of mortgage defaults to increase by around 200,000 per year even before the start of the financial crisis, suggesting that the reform increased the severity of the crisis when it came.

Suggested Citation

  • Wenli Li & Michelle J. White & Ning S. Zhu, 2010. "Did bankruptcy reform cause mortgage default rates to rise?," Working Papers 10-16, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:10-16
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    Cited by:

    1. Rajeev Darolia & Dubravka Ritter, 2020. "Strategic Default Among Private Student Loan Debtors: Evidence from Bankruptcy Reform," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 15(3), pages 487-517, Summer.
    2. Frank P. Stafford & Erik Hurst & Bing Chen, 2012. "Diminishing Margins: Housing Market Declines and Family Financial Responses," Working Papers wp276, University of Michigan, Michigan Retirement Research Center.
    3. Kayla Badding & E. Frank Stephenson & Melissa Yeoh, 2012. "Health-care reform and bankruptcy: evidence from Massachusetts," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(17), pages 1741-1744.
    4. Kurt Mitman, 2016. "Macroeconomic Effects of Bankruptcy and Foreclosure Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(8), pages 2219-2255, August.
    5. Kartik Athreya & Juan M. Sánchez & Xuan S. Tam & Eric R. Young, 2018. "Bankruptcy And Delinquency In A Model Of Unsecured Debt," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 593-623, May.
    6. Michelle White & Wenli Li, 2011. "Residential Mortgage Default and Consumer Bankruptcy: Theory and Empirical Evidence," 2011 Meeting Papers 1038, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. European Central Bank & Stefano Corradin, 2009. "Household Leverage," 2009 Meeting Papers 906, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Jason Allen & Kiana Basiri, 2016. "The Impact of Bankruptcy Reform on Insolvency Choice and Consumer Credit," Staff Working Papers 16-26, Bank of Canada.
    9. John Y. Campbell, 2013. "Mortgage Market Design," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 17(1), pages 1-33.
    10. Gene Amromin & Jennifer Huang & Clemens Sialm & Edward Zhong, 2018. "Complex Mortgages [Why don’t lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? Redefaults, self-cures, and securitization]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 22(6), pages 1975-2007.
    11. Lauren Lambie-Hanson & Timothy Lambie-Hanson, 2017. "Agency and Incentives: Vertical Integration in the Mortgage Foreclosure Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 51(1), pages 1-24, August.
    12. Dilip Mookherjee & Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal, 2011. "How Did the US Housing Slump Begin? The Role of the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2011-033, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    13. Rajeev Darolia & Dubravka Ritter, 2015. "Do student loan borrowers opportunistically default? Evidence from bankruptcy reform," Working Papers 15-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    14. Kartik Athreya, 2012. "A Model of Credit Card Delinquency," 2012 Meeting Papers 981, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    15. Jeffrey Traczynski, 2016. "Personal Bankruptcy and Social Insurance," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(04), pages 23-27, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bankruptcy; Law and legislation; Foreclosure; Default (Finance); Mortgage loans; Global financial crisis;
    All these keywords.

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