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Predatory lending in rational world

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Author Info
Philip Bond
David K. Musto
Bilge Yilmaz
Abstract

Regulators express growing concern over “predatory lending,” which we take to mean lending that reduces the expected utility of borrowers. We present a rational model of consumer credit in which such lending is possible, and identify the circumstances in which it arises with and without competition. Predatory lending is associated with imperfect competition, highly collateralized loans, and poorly informed borrowers. Under most circumstances competition among lenders eliminates predatory lending.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in its series Working Papers with number 06-2.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:06-2

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Keywords: Predatory lending;

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References listed on IDEAS
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    Other versions:
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  8. Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, 2006. "Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 121(2), pages 505-540, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, 2002. "The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 168-207, January.
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Danny Ben-Shahar, 2008. "Default, Credit Scoring, and Loan-to-Value: a Theoretical Analysis under Competitive and Non-Competitive Mortgage Markets," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 30(2), pages 161-190. [Downloadable!]
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