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Design of contingent capital with a stock price trigger for mandatory conversion

Author

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  • Suresh Sundaresan
  • Zhenyu Wang

Abstract

Contingent capital (CC), a regulatory debt that must convert into common equity when a bank?s equity value falls below a specified threshold (a trigger), does not in general lead to a unique equilibrium in the prices of the bank?s equity and CC. Multiplicity or absence of equilibrium arises because economic agents are not allowed to choose a conversion policy in their best interests. The lack of unique equilibrium introduces the potential for price manipulation, market uncertainty, inefficient capital allocation, and unreliability of conversion. Because CC may not convert to equity in a timely and reliable manner, it is not a substitute for common equity as capital buffer. The problem exists even if banks can issue new equity to avoid conversion. The problem is more pronounced when bank asset value has jumps and when bankruptcy is costly. For a unique equilibrium to exist, allowing for jumps and bankruptcy costs, we prove that, at trigger price, mandatory conversion must not transfer value between equity holders and CC investors. Besides the challenge of practically designing such a CC, absence of value transfer prevents punishment of bank managers at conversion. This is problematic because punitive conversion is desirable to generate the desired incentives for bank managers to avoid excessive risk taking.

Suggested Citation

  • Suresh Sundaresan & Zhenyu Wang, 2010. "Design of contingent capital with a stock price trigger for mandatory conversion," Staff Reports 448, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:448
    Note: Previous title: “Design of Contingent Capital with a Stock Price Trigger for Mandatory Conversion” For a published version of this report, see Suresh Sundaresan and Zhenyu Wang, "On the Design of Contingent Capital with Market Trigger," Journal of Finance 70, no. 2 (April 2015): 881-920.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Calomiris, Charles W. & Herring, Richard J., 2011. "Why and How to Design a Contingent Convetible Debt Requirement," Working Papers 11-41, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
    2. Barkbu, Bergljot & Eichengreen, Barry & Mody, Ashoka, 2012. "Financial crises and the multilateral response: What the historical record shows," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 422-435.
    3. Yehning Chen & Iftekhar Hasan, 2011. "Subordinated Debt, Market Discipline, and Bank Risk," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(6), pages 1043-1072, September.
    4. Beyhaghi, Mehdi & D’Souza, Chris & Roberts, Gordon S., 2014. "Funding advantage and market discipline in the Canadian banking sector," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 396-410.
    5. Martynova, Natalya & Perotti, Enrico, 2018. "Convertible bonds and bank risk-taking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 35(PB), pages 61-80.
    6. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2011_020 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Chen, Yehning & Hasan, Iftekhar, 2011. "Subordinated debt, market discipline, and bank risk," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 20/2011, Bank of Finland.
    8. Paul Glasserman & Behzad Nouri, 2012. "Contingent Capital with a Capital-Ratio Trigger," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(10), pages 1816-1833, October.
    9. Berg, Tobias & Kaserer, Christoph, 2015. "Does contingent capital induce excessive risk-taking?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 356-385.
    10. Kenjiro Hori & Jorge Martin Ceron, 2016. "Removing Moral Hazard and Agency Costs in Banks: Beyond CoCo Bonds," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 1603, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
    11. Markus Buergi, 2013. "Pricing contingent convertibles: a general framework for application in practice," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, vol. 27(1), pages 31-63, March.
    12. Koziol, Christian & Lawrenz, Jochen, 2012. "Contingent convertibles. Solving or seeding the next banking crisis?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 90-104.
    13. Charles W. Calomiris & Richard J. Herring, 2013. "How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement That Helps Solve Our Too-Big-to-Fail Problem," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 25(2), pages 39-62, June.
    14. McDonald, Robert L., 2013. "Contingent capital with a dual price trigger," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 230-241.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    contingent capital; banking;

    JEL classification:

    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors

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