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Sharing the risk of settlement failure

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Author Info
Hiroshi Fujiki
Edward J. Green
Akira Yamazaki

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Abstract

Two policies toward payments-system risk are common, but superficially appear to be contradictory. One policy is to restrict the exposure to risk generated by one participant to other participants who are, by one measure or another, directly concerned with the risky participant. The other policy is to provide a “safety net,” typically provided by government and funded by taxes collected from all participants and even from non-participants, to share losses due to “systemic risk.” In this paper, we provide a model in which both of these policies can be constituents of an economically efficient regime of payments-risk management.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in its series Working Papers with number 594.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmwp:594

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Keywords: Payment systems Risk management

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Freeman, Scott, 1996. "Clearinghouse banks and banknote over-issue," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 101-115, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Timberlake, Richard H, Jr, 1984. "The Central Banking Role of Clearinghouse Associations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(1), pages 1-15, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Freeman, Scott, 1996. "The Payments System, Liquidity, and Rediscounting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1126-38, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. King, Robert G., 1983. "On the economics of private money," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 127-158. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Roger Lagunoff & Stacey L. Schreft, 1998. "A Model of Financial Fragility," Game Theory and Information 9803001, EconWPA, revised 30 Apr 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1999. "Financial Contagion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2092, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Nilssen,T., 2000. "Risk externalities in a payments oligopoly," Memorandum 10/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. William Roberds & Charles M. Kahn, 2004. "Payments Settlement under Limited Enforcement: Private versus Public Systems," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 13, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Ted Temzelides, 2007. "A dynamic model of the payment system," Working Papers 07-22, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
  6. Thor Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Ted Temzelides, 2007. "Payments and Mechanism Design," Working Papers 1124, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1998. "Financial Contagion Journal of Political Economy," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 98-31, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  8. Stephen Williamson, 2000. "The Research Agenda: Payment Systems and Private Money," EconomicDynamics Newsletter, Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 2(1), November. [Downloadable!]
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