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Deposit insurance: a reconsideration

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Author Info
John H. Boyd
Chun Chang
Bruce D. Smith

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Abstract

This paper undertakes a simple general equilibrium analysis of the consequences of deposit insurance programs, the way in which they are priced and the way in which they fund revenue shortfalls. We show that the central issue is how the government will make up any FDIC losses. Under one scheme for making up the losses, we show that FDIC policy is irrelevant: it does not matter what premium is charged, nor does it matter how big FDIC losses are. Under another scheme, all that matters is the magnitude of the losses. And there is no presumption that small losses are “good.” We also show that multiple equilibria can be observed and Pareto ranked. Some economies may be “trapped” in equilibria with inefficient financial systems. Our analysis provides counterexamples to the following propositions. (1) Actuarially fair pricing of deposit insurance is always desirable. (2) Implicit FDIC subsidization of banks through deposit insurance is always undesirable. (3) “Large” FDIC losses are necessarily symptomatic of a poorly designed deposit insurance system.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in its series Working Papers with number 593.

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Date of creation: 1998
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmwp:593

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Keywords: Deposit insurance

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ross Levine, 1997. "Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(2), pages 688-726, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. John H. Boyd & Chun Chang & Bruce D. Smith, 1998. "Moral hazard under commercial and universal banking," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Aug, pages 426-471.
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  3. Berlin, Mitchell & John, Kose & Saunders, Anthony, 1996. "Bank Equity Stakes in Borrowing Firms and Financial Distress," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 9(3), pages 889-919. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Boyd, John H & Smith, Bruce D, 1994. "How Good Are Standard Debt Contracts? Stochastic versus Nonstochastic Monitoring in a Costly State Verification Environment," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(4), pages 539-61, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. George A. Akerlof & Paul M. Romer, 1993. "Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 24(1993-2), pages 1-74. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Gorton, Gary B. & Haubrich, Joseph G., 1987. "Bank deregulation, credit markets, and the control of capital," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 289-333, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. John, Kose & John, Teresa A. & Saunders, Anthony, 1994. "Universal banking and firm risk-taking," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 307-323, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Kareken, John H & Wallace, Neil, 1978. "Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A Partial-Equilibrium Exposition," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(3), pages 413-38, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Gertler, M.L. & Hubbard, R.G., 1988. "Financial Factors In Business Fluctuations," Papers fb-_88-37, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.
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  11. Chan, Yuk-Shee & Greenbaum, Stuart I & Thakor, Anjan V, 1992. " Is Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance Possible?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(1), pages 227-45, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Williamson, Stephen D., 1986. "Costly monitoring, financial intermediation, and equilibrium credit rationing," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-179, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Antoine Martin, 2001. "Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance : preventing bank panics without moral hazard?," Research Working Paper RWP 01-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2004. "State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics," Working Paper 04-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Edward S. Prescott, 2002. "Can risk-based deposit insurance premiums control moral hazard?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 87-100. [Downloadable!]
  4. Margarita Samartín & Clara Cardone & Rodrigo Bustamante, 2004. "Was The Argentine Corralito An Efficient Measure?: A Note," Business Economics Working Papers wb042209, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía de la Empresa. [Downloadable!]
  5. Andrea M. Maechler & Kathleen McDill, 2003. "Dynamic Depositor Discipline in U.S. Banks," IMF Working Papers 03/226, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  6. Gianni De Nicoló & John H. Boyd, 2003. "Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited," IMF Working Papers 03/114, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  7. Francesca Carapella & Giorgio Di Giorgio, 2003. "Deposit insurance, institutions and bank interest rates," Discussion Papers 0304-06, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Bruce D. Smith & Gianni De Nicoló & John H. Boyd, 2003. "Crisis in Competitive versus Monopolistic Banking Systems," IMF Working Papers 03/188, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. David A. Marshall & Edward S. Prescott, 2000. "Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties," Working Paper Series WP-00-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Gianni De Nicolo, 2000. "Size, charter value and risk in banking: an international perspective," International Finance Discussion Papers 689, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
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