When target CEOs contract with acquirers: evidence from bank mergers and acquisitions
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Barclay, Michael J & Holderness, Clifford G, 1991. "Negotiated Block Trades and Corporate Control," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(3), pages 861-878, July.
- Chandra Subramaniam & Lane A. Daley, 2000. "Free Cash Flow, Golden Parachutes, and the Discipline of Takeover Activity," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1‐2), pages 1-36, January.
- Andres Almazan & Javier Suarez, 2003. "Entrenchment and Severance Pay in Optimal Governance Structures," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(2), pages 519-548, April.
- Yermack, David, 1996. "Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-211, February.
- George J. Benston & William C. Hunter & Larry D. Wall, 1992. "Motivations for bank mergers and acquisitions: enhancing the deposit insurance put option versus increasing operating net cash flow," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 92-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Elijah Brewer & William E. Jackson & Julapa Jagtiani, 2000. "Impact of independent directors and the regulatory environment on bank merger prices: evidence from takeover activity in the 1990s," Working Paper Series WP-00-31, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Yaron Brook & Robert Hendershott & Darrell Lee, 1998. "The Gains from Takeover Deregulation: Evidence from the End of Interstate Banking Restrictions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(6), pages 2185-2204, December.
- Bliss, Richard T. & Rosen, Richard J., 2001. "CEO compensation and bank mergers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 107-138, July.
- Chandra Subramaniam & Lane A. Daley, 2000. "Free Cash Flow, Golden Parachutes, and the Discipline of Takeover Activity," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1&2), pages 1-36.
- Bradley, Michael & Desai, Anand & Kim, E. Han, 1988. "Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 3-40, May.
- Cotter, James F. & Zenner, Marc, 1994. "How managerial wealth affects the tender offer process," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 63-97, February.
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986.
"Large Shareholders and Corporate Control,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Scholarly Articles 3606237, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Ellie G. Harris, 1990. "Antitakeover Measures, Golden Parachutes, and Target Firm Shareholder Welfare," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(4), pages 614-625, Winter.
- Lambert, Richard A. & Larcker, David F., 1985. "Golden parachutes, executive decision-making, and shareholder wealth," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 179-203, April.
- Andres Almazan & Javier Suarez, 2003. "Entrenchment and Severance Pay in Optimal Governance Structures," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(2), pages 519-547, April.
- Moeller, Thomas, 2005. "Let's make a deal! How shareholder control impacts merger payoffs," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 167-190, April.
- Houston, Joel F. & Ryngaert, Michael D., 1994. "The overall gains from large bank mergers," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 1155-1176, December.
- Houston, Joel F. & James, Christopher M. & Ryngaert, Michael D., 2001. "Where do merger gains come from? Bank mergers from the perspective of insiders and outsiders," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2-3), pages 285-331, May.
- Julie Wulf, 2004. "Do CEOs in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from "Mergers of Equals"," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 60-101, April.
- Jensen, Michael C, 1988. "Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 21-48, Winter.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Sokolyk, Tatyana, 2011. "The effects of antitakeover provisions on acquisition targets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 612-627, June.
- Dirk Jenter & Katharina Lewellen, 2015.
"CEO Preferences and Acquisitions,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(6), pages 2813-2852, December.
- Dirk Jenter & Katharina Lewellen, 2011. "CEO Preferences and Acquisitions," NBER Working Papers 17663, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jenter, Dirk & Lewellen, Katharina, 2011. "CEO Preferences and Acquisitions," Research Papers 2089, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Dirk Jenter & Katharina Lewellen, 2011. "CEO Preferences and Acquisitions," CESifo Working Paper Series 3681, CESifo.
- Offenberg, David & Officer, Micah S., 2014. "The totality of change-in-control payments," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 75-87.
- Elijah Brewer & William E. Jackson & Julapa Jagtiani, 2007. "Target's corporate governance and bank merger payoffs," Research Working Paper RWP 07-13, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
- Bebchuk, Lucian & Cohen, Alma & Wang, Charles C.Y., 2014.
"Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders,"
Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 140-154.
- Bebchuk, Lucian & Cohen, Alma & Wang, Charles C.Y., 2013. "Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275792, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
- Peter M. Clarkson & Allen Craswell & Prue Mackenzie, 2008. "The Effect of Board Independence on Target Shareholder Wealth," Australian Accounting Review, CPA Australia, vol. 18(2), pages 135-148, June.
- Eisfeldt, Andrea L. & Rampini, Adriano A., 2008. "Managerial incentives, capital reallocation, and the business cycle," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 177-199, January.
- Fich, Eliezer M. & Cai, Jie & Tran, Anh L., 2011. "Stock option grants to target CEOs during private merger negotiations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 413-430, August.
- Elijah Brewer & William E. Jackson & Julapa Jagtiani, 2010. "Corporate governance structure and mergers," Working Papers 10-26, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Lefanowicz, Craig E. & Robinson, John R. & Smith, Reed, 2000. "Golden parachutes and managerial incentives in corporate acquisitions: evidence from the 1980s and 1990s," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 215-239, July.
- Rungporn Roengpitya, 2008. "The Effects of Financial Deregulation on Bank Governance: The Panel Data Evidence of the 1990s," Working Papers 2008-08, Monetary Policy Group, Bank of Thailand.
- Słomka-Gołębiowska, Agnieszka & Urbanek, Piotr, 2016. "Corporate boards, large blockholders and executive compensation in banks: Evidence from Poland," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 203-220.
- Franco Ernesto Rubino & Paolo Tenuta & Domenico Rocco Cambrea, 2017. "Board characteristics effects on performance in family and non-family business: a multi-theoretical approach," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 21(3), pages 623-658, September.
- Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2017.
"Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options,"
The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 68(4), pages 521-554, December.
- Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2017. "Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 68(4), pages 521-554, December.
- Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2011. "Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies, and Real Options," KIER Working Papers 768, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Meg Adachi‐Sato, 2018. "Stock vesting conditions, control benefits and managerial replacement," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(1), pages 275-313, February.
- Etienne Redor, 2016. "Board attributes and shareholder wealth in mergers and acquisitions: a survey of the literature," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 20(4), pages 789-821, December.
- Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger, 2006. "CEO Compensation and Strategy Inertia," CEPR Discussion Papers 5713, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ross Levine & Chen Lin & Zigan Wang, 2020. "Bank Networks and Acquisitions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(11), pages 5216-5241, November.
- Meg Adachi-Sato, 2013. "Incentive Pay that Causes Inefficient Managerial Replacement ," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-890, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Cotter, James F. & Shivdasani, Anil & Zenner, Marc, 1997. "Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 195-218, February.
More about this item
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BAN-2007-01-02 (Banking)
- NEP-BEC-2007-01-02 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2007-01-02 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CSE-2007-01-02 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-FMK-2007-01-02 (Financial Markets)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedawp:2006-28. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Rob Sarwark (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbatus.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.