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Is a Liberal Justice, Totalitarian?

Author

Listed:
  • François-Régis Mahieu
  • Augendra Bhukuth

    (Fonds pour la Recherche en Ethique Economique)

Abstract

In Social Choice Theory, Pareto-Unanimity is an important rule which is applied to compensation tests and therefore in justice. But, deductive logics show that Pareto- Unanimity implies dictatorship and therefore, Pareto-Unanimity is contradictory with non dictatorship. In the case of compensation, citizens are free and accountable for their own behaviour; the Pareto-unanimity implies perfect information on benefactors. Liberty implies dictatorship and then Pareto-Unanimity. compensation exigencies lead to a totalitarian society, as forwarded by the novel of George Orwell (1984).

Suggested Citation

  • François-Régis Mahieu & Augendra Bhukuth, 2009. "Is a Liberal Justice, Totalitarian?," Working Papers 12009, Fonds pour la Recherche en Ethique Economique.
    • Handle: RePEc:fet:wpaper:12009
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    File URL: http://ethique.perso.sfr.fr/Working%20paper%20FREE-Cahier%20FREE%20n-%A61-2009.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2009
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dictatorship; Pareto-Unanimity; Compensation; Responsibility; Private Information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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