Fair representation of voters in a committee representing different voters’ groups is being broadly discussed during last few years. Assuming we know what the fair representation is, there exists a problem of optimal quota: given a “fair” distribution of voting weights, how to set up voting rule (quota) in such a way that distribution of relative a priori voting power is as close as possible to distribution of relative voting weights. Together with optimal quota problem a problem of trade-off between fairness and efficiency (ability of a voting body to change status quo) is formalized by a fairness-efficiency matrix.
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Paper provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies in its series Working Papers IES with number
2009/13.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
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