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Le régime d’assurance chômage en France : mécanique, pilotage et évaluation

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Abstract

Périmètre et composition du chômage indemnisé dépendent en premier lieu des catégories administratives du Régime d’assurance chômage (Rac). Les règles qui en découlent reposent sur la fixation de paramètres clés. Il s’avère que la modulation de ces paramètres, même dans le cadre contraignant des catégories du Rac, permet un véritable pilotage des contours du chômage indemnisé. Le présent travail analyse la mécanique du Rac et décrit quelques principes d’un pilotage qui tient compte des caractéristiques du marché du travail. Cette démarche permet de guider l’évaluation. Elle permet aussi de situer le Rac entre les doctrines structurant la question du juste périmètre du chômage indemnisé: logique solidaire ou contributive, incitation ou sécurisation, priorité structurelle ou conjoncturelle.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Baguelin, 2011. "Le régime d’assurance chômage en France : mécanique, pilotage et évaluation," Documents de recherche 11-07, Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne.
  • Handle: RePEc:eve:wpaper:11-07
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09h9593coc9 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Raj Chetty, 2008. "Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 173-234, April.
    3. Acemoglu, Daron & Shimer, Robert, 2000. "Productivity gains from unemployment insurance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(7), pages 1195-1224, June.
    4. Raj Chetty, 2008. "Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 173-234, April.
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