To explain the extremely long-term persistence (more than 500 years) of positive historical experiences of cooperation (Putnam, 1993), we model the intergenerational transmission of priors about the trustworthiness of others. We show that this transmission tends to be biased toward excessively conservative priors. As a result, societies can be trapped in a low-trust equilibrium. In this context, a temporary shock to the return to trusting can have a permanent effect on the level of trust. We validate the model by testing its predictions on the World Values Survey data and the German Socio Economic Panel. We also present some anecdotal evidence that these priors are reflected in the novels originated in different parts of the country.
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Paper provided by European University Institute in its series Economics Working Papers with number
ECO2007/57.
Length: Date of creation: 2007 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2007/57
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Find related papers by JEL classification: A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values N00 - Economic History - - General - - - General O1 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
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