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Academic Shared Governance And Performance: Theoretical Issues And Empirical Evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Giacomo Degli Antoni

    (University of Parma, Department of Law)

  • Magalì Fia

    (Dipartimento di ingegneria gestionale, Politecnico di Milano)

  • Lorenzo Sacconi

    (University of Milan)

Abstract

In the debate surrounding various reforms in higher education systems, performance, along with how universities should be governed, have been main issues. We argue that the demand for shared governance, i.e., faculty participation in decision‐making vs. concentrated or top‐down decision‐ making, is driven by the characteristics of academic transactions. Especially in universities, shared governance prevents that the unilateral allocation of authority paves the way to the abuse of authority, which would depress incentives to undertake optimal idiosyncratic investments in human cognitive resources, or prevent cooperation in a context characterized by contractual incompleteness and transactions involving multiple specific investments and coessential resources. To empirically analyze our hypothesis, we collect original survey data of Italian universities in 2015. We find that shared decision‐making processes are correlated with better performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Giacomo Degli Antoni & Magalì Fia & Lorenzo Sacconi, 2019. "Academic Shared Governance And Performance: Theoretical Issues And Empirical Evidence," Econometica Working Papers wp69, Econometica.
    • Handle: RePEc:ent:wpaper:wp69
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    universities; shared governance; new public management; performance; theory of the firm; economics of institutions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
    • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
    • I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

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