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Pooling, Access, and Countervailing Power in Channel Governance

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  • Hendrikse, G.W.J.

Abstract

Fruit and vegetable marketing organization The Greenery has experienced various governance structure changes, like horizontal merger, forward integration, and the emergence of grower associations. A multilateral incomplete contracting model is presented to account for these changes by analysing the interactions between pooling, access, and countervailing power. This model does not only explain the changes at The Greenery, but it contributes also to the design of efficient channel governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Hendrikse, G.W.J., 2011. "Pooling, Access, and Countervailing Power in Channel Governance," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2011-009-ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    • Handle: RePEc:ems:eureri:22815
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    Cited by:

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    2. López-Bayón, Susana & González-Díaz, Manuel & Solís-Rodríguez, Vanesa & Fernández-Barcala, Marta, 2018. "Governance decisions in the supply chain and quality performance: The synergistic effect of geographical indications and ownership structure," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 1-12.
    3. Wendong Deng & George Hendrikse & Qiao Liang, 2021. "Internal social capital and the life cycle of agricultural cooperatives," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 301-323, January.
    4. Julia HÖHLER & Rainer KÜHL, 2018. "Dimensions Of Member Heterogeneity In Cooperatives And Their Impact On Organization – A Literature Review," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 89(4), pages 697-712, December.
    5. Liang, Q.X. & Hendrikse, G.W.J. & Huang, Z. & Xu, X., 2012. "Core and Common Members in Chinese Farmer Cooperatives," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2012-002-STR, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    6. Joachim Henkel & Alexander Hoffmann, 2019. "Value capture in hierarchically organized value chains," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 260-279, April.
    7. Manouchehrabadi, Behrang & Letizia, Paolo & Hendrikse, George, 2021. "Governance of collective entrepreneurship," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 370-389.
    8. Deng, Wendong & Hendrikse, George, 2014. "Social capital and incentives in the provision of product quality by cooperatives," 2014 International Congress, August 26-29, 2014, Ljubljana, Slovenia 182687, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    9. Liang, Qiao & Hendrikse, George, 2016. "Pooling and the yardstick effect of cooperatives," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 97-105.
    10. Theo Benos & Nikos Kalogeras & Frans J.H.M. Verhees & Panagiota Sergaki & Joost M.E. Pennings, 2016. "Cooperatives’ Organizational Restructuring, Strategic Attributes, and Performance: The Case of Agribusiness Cooperatives in Greece," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(1), pages 127-150, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    channel governance; cooperatives; foreclosure; incomplete contracts; market power; pooling;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics
    • M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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