Optimal sequential auctions
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- Jofre-Bonet, Mireia & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2014. "Optimal sequential auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 61-71.
- Jofre-Bonet, Mireia & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2006. "Optimal sequential auctions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 4911, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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Cited by:
- Mochon, Pablo & Mochon, Asuncion & Saez, Yago, 2022. "Combinatorial versus sequential auctions to allocate PPP highway projects," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 23-39.
- Charles J. Thomas, 2010. "Information Revelation And Buyer Profits In Repeated Procurement Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 79-105, March.
- Dennis Clerck & Erik Demeulemeester, 2016. "A sequential procurement model for a PPP project pipeline," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 38(2), pages 427-457, March.
- Fanqi Shi & Yiqing Xing, 2022. "Implementing optimal outcomes through sequential auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(4), pages 703-732, December.
- Saini, Viplav, 2010. "Reserve prices in a dynamic auction when bidders are capacity-constrained," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 303-306, September.
- Gonzalo Cisternas & Nicolás Figueroa, 2015.
"Sequential procurement auctions and their effect on investment decisions,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(4), pages 824-843, October.
- Nicolás Figueroa & Gonzalo Cisternas, 2007. "Sequential Procurement Auctions and Their Effect on Investment Decisions," Documentos de Trabajo 230, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Wittwer, Milena, 2020. "Interconnected pay-as-bid auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 506-530.
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More about this item
Keywords
Sequential auctions; Optimal auctions; Complementarities; Substitutes;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L00 - Industrial Organization - - General - - - General
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2016-02-29 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2016-02-29 (Microeconomics)
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