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On Corruption and Institutions in Decentralised Economies

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Author Info
Andrianova, Svetlana (Loughborough University)

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Abstract

This paper studies opportunistic behaviour in a model of decentralised economic exchange and inadequate institutional framework of formal contract enforcement. It is shown that (i) when the number of cheating traders is sufficiently large, inadequate institutions result in a loss of decentralised trading contracts which suggests yet another explanation of the output fall puzzle of the recent transition experience; (ii) while being necessary for the attainment of a Pareto optimal outcome, an adequate institutional framework may not be sufficient if traders perceive it as inadequate; and (iii) in the presence of adequate institutional framework, even if enforcers are corrupt contractual breach is deterred when enforcers enjoy strong bargaining power.

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Paper provided by Royal Economic Society in its series Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 with number 7.

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Date of creation: 29 Aug 2002
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Handle: RePEc:ecj:ac2002:7

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  1. Acemoglu, Daron & Verdier, Thierry, 1998. "Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(450), pages 1381-1403, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Koen Schoors & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Passive Creditors," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp737, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1993. "Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 409-14, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Andrianova, Svetlana, 2004. "Decentralisation and the perceived quality of institutions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 77-82, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Simon Johnson & Daniel Kaufman & Andrei Shleifer, 1997. "The Unofficial Economy in Transition," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 28(1997-2), pages 159-240. [Downloadable!]
  7. Frye, Timothy & Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. "The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 354-58, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Kali, Raja, 1999. "Endogenous Business Networks," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 615-36, October.
  9. Gerard Roland, 2002. "The Political Economy of Transition," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 29-50, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Kathryn Hendley & Peter Murrell & Randi Ryterman, 1998. "Law, Relationships, and Private Enforcement: Transactional Strategies of Russian Enterprises," Electronic Working Papers 98-001, University of Maryland, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  12. McMillan, John & Woodruff, Christopher, 1999. "Dispute Prevention without Courts in Vietnam," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 637-58, October.
  13. Blume, Andreas, 2003. "Bertrand without fudge," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 167-168, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Abbink, Klaus & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Renner, Elke, 2000. "The moonlighting game: An experimental study on reciprocity and retribution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 265-277, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Svetlana Andrianova & Panicos Demetriades & Anja Shortland, 2006. "Government Ownership of Banks, Institutions, and Financial Development," WEF Working Papers 0011, ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Karla Hoff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2002. "After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the emergence of the rule of law in post-communist societies," Discussion Papers 0203-03, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Leonid Polishchuk & Alexei Savvateev, 2004. "Spontaneous (non)emergence of property rights," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 12(1), pages 103-127, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Vai-Lam Mui, 1999. "Contracting in the Shadow of a Corrupt Court," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(2), pages 249-, June.
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  19. Blanchard, Olivier & Kremer, Michael, 1997. "Disorganization," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1091-1126, November.
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  20. Johnson, Simon & Kaufmann, Daniel & McMillan, John & Woodruff, Christopher, 2000. "Why do firms hide? Bribes and unofficial activity after communism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 495-520, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. Erik Berglof & Patrick Bolton, 2002. "The Great Divide and Beyond: Financial Architecture in Transition," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 77-100, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2001. "Corruption and optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 1-24, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  23. Robert J. Shiller & Maxim Boycko & Vladimir Korobov, 1991. "Popular Attitudes Towards Free Markets: The Soviet Union and the United States Compared," NBER Working Papers 3453, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  24. Sonin, Konstantin, 2003. "Why the rich may favor poor protection of property rights," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 715-731, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  25. Tirole, Jean, 1996. "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(1), pages 1-22, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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