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CCP initial margin models in Europe

Author

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  • Boudiaf, Ismael Alexander
  • Scheicher, Martin
  • Vacirca, Francesco

Abstract

In this paper we aim to provide a holistic understanding of the Initial Margin (IM) models used by Central Counterparties (CCPs) in Europe. In addition to discussing their relevance in terms of CCP risk management and their importance for the functioning of financial markets, we provide an overview of the main modelling frameworks used, including Standard Portfolio Analysis of Risk (SPAN) and Value at Risk (VaR) models.By leveraging on publicly available data, we provide an up-to-date picture of current modelling practices for specific cleared product classes, as well as various trends in IM modelling practices in Europe. We show how IM model frameworks vary materially, depending on the CCP’s past choices and the products it clears. Despite a propensity to switch to VaR models, idiosyncrasies and differences across CCPs are likely to persist.We conclude by highlighting current and upcoming challenges and risks to CCP IM model frameworks and linking the current status quo with ongoing and upcoming regulatory work at European and international level. JEL Classification: G15, G18, G19, G23, G28, G32

Suggested Citation

  • Boudiaf, Ismael Alexander & Scheicher, Martin & Vacirca, Francesco, 2023. "CCP initial margin models in Europe," Occasional Paper Series 314, European Central Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbops:2023314
    Note: 152802
    as

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    File URL: https://www.ecb.europa.eu//pub/pdf/scpops/ecb.op314~afc6d2980c.en.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Duffie, Darrell & Scheicher, Martin & Vuillemey, Guillaume, 2015. "Central clearing and collateral demand," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 237-256.
    2. Wenqian Huang & Előd Takáts, 2020. "Model risk at central counterparties: Is skin-in-the-game a game changer?," BIS Working Papers 866, Bank for International Settlements.
    3. Louise Carter & Duke Cole, 2017. "Central Counterparty Margin Frameworks," RBA Bulletin (Print copy discontinued), Reserve Bank of Australia, pages 84-94, December.
    4. Rehlon, Amandeep & Nixon, Dan, 2013. "Central counterparties: what are they, why do they matter and how does the Bank supervise them?," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 53(2), pages 147-156.
    5. Dietrich Domanski & Leonardo Gambacorta & Cristina Picillo, 2015. "Central clearing: trends and current issues," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Boudiaf, Ismael Alexander & Scheicher, Martin & Frieden, Immo, 2024. "The market liquidity of interest rate swaps," ESRB Working Paper Series 20240, European Systemic Risk Board.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central Counterparties; initial margin models; model governance and validation.; risk management;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G19 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Other
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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