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Information Revelation in an English Auction

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolas Gothelf

Abstract

This paper asks whether revealing the identity of dropping bidders is in the interest of the auctioneer in an ascending price auction with asymmetric bidders and interdependent values. We show that revealing no information about bidders’ identities may increase the expected revenue. In this setup, we identify the underlying mechanism for the failure of the often-heard recommendation that more transparency increases revenue. We also consider bidder ranking over auction formats.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Gothelf, 2010. "Information Revelation in an English Auction," Working Papers ECARES 2010_003, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    • Handle: RePEc:eca:wpaper:2010_003
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information revelation; identity; English auctions; market design.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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