IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ebg/iesewp/d-0411.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Remuneración de directivos mediante opciones sobre acciones: Aspectos económicos y éticos

Author

Listed:
  • Argandoña, Antonio

    (IESE Business School)

Abstract

La remuneración de directivos mediante opciones sobre acciones («stock options») se ha convertido en una práctica cada vez más frecuente, que ha levantado polémicas de naturaleza económica y también ética. En este documento se explican los caracteres de las opciones sobre acciones, su utilización en los planes de captación, retención y motivación de directivos y los efectos esperados de las mismas, incluyendo algunas consideraciones sobre aspectos de carácter ético, como la licitud del objetivo de las «stock options» (la maximización del valor de las acciones) y los problemas de justicia que se presentan cuando, en fases expansivas del mercado de capitales, los directivos reciben remuneraciones muy elevadas gracias a dichas opciones.

Suggested Citation

  • Argandoña, Antonio, 2000. "Remuneración de directivos mediante opciones sobre acciones: Aspectos económicos y éticos," IESE Research Papers D/411, IESE Business School.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0411
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.iese.edu/research/pdfs/DI-0411.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. Yermack, David, 1997. "Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 449-476, June.
    3. Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1991. "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(2), pages 503-530.
    4. Black, Fischer & Scholes, Myron S, 1973. "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 637-654, May-June.
    5. Lambert, Richard A. & Lanen, William N. & Larcker, David F., 1989. "Executive Stock Option Plans and Corporate Dividend Policy," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(4), pages 409-425, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2485-2563 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Muurling, Rutger & Lehnert, Thorsten, 2004. "Option-based compensation: a survey," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 365-401.
    3. Stephen G. Sapp, 2008. "The Impact of Corporate Governance on Executive Compensation," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 14(4), pages 710-746, September.
    4. Kato, Hideaki Kiyoshi & Lemmon, Michael & Luo, Mi & Schallheim, James, 2005. "An empirical examination of the costs and benefits of executive stock options: Evidence from Japan," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 435-461, November.
    5. Pasternack, Daniel & Rosenberg, Matts, 2003. "What Determines Stock Option Contract Design?," Working Papers 498, Hanken School of Economics.
    6. Hamza Bahaji, 2011. "Incentives from stock option grants: a behavioral approach," Post-Print halshs-00681607, HAL.
    7. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Martijn Cremers & Urs Peyer, 2007. "CEO Centrality," NBER Working Papers 13701, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Denton Collins & Gary Fleischman & Stacey Kaden & Juan Manuel Sanchez, 2018. "How Powerful CFOs Camouflage and Exploit Equity-Based Incentive Compensation," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 153(2), pages 591-613, December.
    9. Chi, Wei & Wang, Yijiang, 2008. "Bribe-Taking by Bureaucrats: Personal and Circumstantial Determinants," MPRA Paper 8668, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Sun, Sophia Li & Habib, Ahsan, 2020. "Determinants and consequences of tournament incentives: A survey of the literature in accounting and finance," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    11. Agarwal, Vikas & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naik, Narayan Y., 2009. "Role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performance," CFR Working Papers 04-04, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    12. Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, 2010. "CEO Compensation," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 75-102, December.
    13. Liljeblom, Eva & Pasternack, Daniel & Rosenberg, Matts, 2011. "What determines stock option contract design?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 293-316.
    14. Paul André & M. Martin Boyer & Robert Gagné, 2002. "Do CEOs Exercise Their Stock Options Earlier than Other Executives?," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-71, CIRANO.
    15. Canil, Jean, 2017. "Non-dividend protected executive options and dividend policy: Evidence from SFAS 123R," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 15-33.
    16. Bang Dang Nguyen & Kasper Meisner Nielsen, 2014. "What Death Can Tell: Are Executives Paid for Their Contributions to Firm Value?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(12), pages 2994-3010, December.
    17. Carpenter, Jennifer N., 1998. "The exercise and valuation of executive stock options," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 127-158, May.
    18. Kini, Omesh & Williams, Ryan, 2012. "Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 350-376.
    19. Denis Cormier & Michel Magnan & Mahé Léna Fall, 1999. "L'octroi d'options sur actions aux dirigeants et la performance financière de la firme:une étude canadienne," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 2(2), pages 25-49, June.
    20. Chen, Yu-Fu & Zoega, Gylfi, 2010. "An essay on the generational effect of employment protection," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 349-359, May.
    21. Eisdorfer, Assaf & Giaccotto, Carmelo & White, Reilly, 2015. "Do corporate managers skimp on shareholders' dividends to protect their own retirement funds?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 257-277.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0411. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Noelia Romero (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ienaves.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.