IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/drm/wpaper/2017-43.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Welfarism and segregation in endogenous jurisdiction formation models

Author

Listed:
  • Remy Oddou

Abstract

This paper analyses how welfarism affects the segregative properties of endogenous jurisdiction formation, in a model where local jurisdictions produce a local public good and distribute an allowance to their households, both financed by a proportional tax based on the households' wealth. A jurisdiction is composed of all the households that live in the same place. Local wealth tax rates and the level of the allowance are determined to maximize a social welfare function. Households can "vote with their feet", which means that they can choose to move to the jurisdiction that offers the package "tax rate - amount of public good - allowance" that provides the highest utility level. The main result of this article is the proof that the maximin criterium is more segregative than the utilitarian one.

Suggested Citation

  • Remy Oddou, 2017. "Welfarism and segregation in endogenous jurisdiction formation models," EconomiX Working Papers 2017-43, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
  • Handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2017-43
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://economix.fr/pdf/dt/2017/WP_EcoX_2017-43.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gravel, Nicolas & Thoron, Sylvie, 2007. "Does endogenous formation of jurisdictions lead to wealth-stratification?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 569-583, January.
    2. E. IndurÂin & J. C. Candeal & G. Chichilnisky, 1997. "Topological aggregation of preferences: the case of a continuum of agents," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 14(2), pages 333-343.
    3. Gravel, Nicolas & Oddou, Rémy, 2014. "The segregative properties of endogenous jurisdiction formation with a land market," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 15-27.
    4. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(5), pages 416-416.
    5. Caplin, Andrew & Nalebuff, Barry, 1997. "Competition among Institutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 306-342, February.
    6. Kanemoto, Yoshitsugu, 1988. "Hedonic Prices and the Benefits of Public Projects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 981-989, July.
    7. Westhoff, Frank, 1977. "Existence of equilibria in economies with a local public good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 84-112, February.
    8. Biswas, Rongili & Gravel, Nicolas & Oddou, Rémy, 2009. "The segregative properties of endogenous jurisdictions formation with a welfarist central government," POLIS Working Papers 121, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
    9. Rémy Oddou, 2011. "The Effect of Spillovers and Congestion on the Segregative Properties of Endogenous Jurisdiction Structure Formation," Working Papers 2011.46, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    10. Greenberg, Joseph & Weber, Shlomo, 1986. "Strong tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 101-117, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Rémy Oddou, 2017. "Welfarism and segregation in endogenous jurisdiction formation models," Working Papers hal-04141624, HAL.
    2. Rongili Biswas & Nicolas Gravel & Rémy Oddou, 2013. "The segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdictions with a welfarist central government," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(2), pages 293-319, July.
    3. Remy Oddou, 2017. "The effect of a local allowance on the endogenous formation of jurisdictions," EconomiX Working Papers 2017-42, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    4. Gravel, Nicolas & Oddou, Rémy, 2014. "The segregative properties of endogenous jurisdiction formation with a land market," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 15-27.
    5. Remy Oddou, 2020. "The effect of a progressive taxation scheme on the endogenous formation of jurisdictions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1705-1712, September.
    6. Pan, Chen-Yu, 2020. "Protections from natural disasters as local public goods: Migration and local adaptations," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    7. Allouch, Nizar & Conley, John P. & Wooders, Myrna, 2009. "Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: Existence and characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(9-10), pages 492-510, September.
    8. Calabrese, Stephen & Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard, 2023. "Majority choice of taxation and redistribution in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    9. Kranz, Sebastian, 2010. "Moral norms in a partly compliant society," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 255-274, January.
    10. Rémy Oddou, 2011. "The effect of spillovers and congestion on the segregative properties of endogenous jurisdictions formation," THEMA Working Papers 2011-24, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    11. Rémy Oddou, 2017. "The effect of a local allowance on the endogenous formation of jurisdictions," Working Papers hal-04141625, HAL.
    12. Remy Oddou, 2015. "Firms location and sorting," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(3), pages 1782-1787.
    13. Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij, 2000. "Formation of Nations in a Welfare‐State Minded World," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(2), pages 157-181, April.
    14. John P. Conley & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1998. "The Tiebout Hypothesis: On the Existence of Pareto Efficient Competitive Equilibrium," Working Papers mwooders-98-06, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    15. Gabrielle Demange, 2017. "The stability of group formation," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(4), pages 495-516.
    16. Alison Watts, 2007. "Formation of segregated and integrated groups," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(4), pages 505-519, April.
    17. Puy, M. Socorro, 2007. "Skill distributions and the compatibility between mobility and redistribution," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 345-362, May.
    18. Barelli, Paulo & Duggan, John, 2015. "Extremal choice equilibrium with applications to large games, stochastic games, & endogenous institutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 95-130.
    19. Florian Kuhlmey & Beat Hintermann, 2019. "The welfare costs of Tiebout sorting with true public goods," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(5), pages 1166-1210, October.
    20. Roller, Marcus, 2016. "Effective Tax Rates and Effective Progressivity in a Fiscally Decentralized Country," CEPR Discussion Papers 11152, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Jurisdiction; Segregation; Welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2017-43. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Valerie Mignon (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/modemfr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.