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Social Learning and Delay in a Dynamic Model of Price Competition

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  • Masaki Aoyagi
  • Manaswini Bhalla
  • Hikmet Gunay

Abstract

This paper studies dynamic price competition over two periods between two firms selling differentiated durable goods to two buyers who are privately informed about their types, but have valuations of the two goods dependent on the other buyer's type. The firms' pricing strategy in period 1 must take into account the buyers' incentive to wait and learn from the other buyer's decision. We construct an equilibrium based on the key observation that the expected price of either good in period 2 is the same as its price in period 1 on and off the path of play. The equilibrium is shown to be non-preemptive in the sense that even if either firm fails to make a sale in period 1, it still makes a sale with positive probability in period 2. A characterization of the equilibrium is given in terms of the probability of delay as a function of the degree of interdependence between the two buyers.

Suggested Citation

  • Masaki Aoyagi & Manaswini Bhalla & Hikmet Gunay, 2014. "Social Learning and Delay in a Dynamic Model of Price Competition," ISER Discussion Paper 0909, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    • Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0909
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    File URL: https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2014/DP0909.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hattori, Keisuke & Zennyo, Yusuke, 2018. "Heterogeneous Consumer Expectations and Monopoly Pricing for Durables with Network Externalities," MPRA Paper 89893, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Nov 2018.
    2. Chenavaz, Régis Y. & Eynan, Amit, 2021. "Advertising, goodwill, and the Veblen effect," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 289(2), pages 676-682.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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