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Gouvernement des entreprises et stratégie du dirigeant:une étude clinique dans le secteur de l'assurance

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  • Fabrice Roth

    (CESAG Université R. Schuman;LATEC CREGO Université de Bourgogne)

Abstract

Cet article s'intéresse à l'interaction entre mécanismes de gouvernement des entreprises et stratégie du dirigeant, dans le cadre du processus décisionnel de l'entreprise. Le cas étudié est celui du groupe d'assurance AXA, de 1987 à 1994. L'étude se focalise sur la mutuelle de contrôle du groupe, plus précisément, sur la composition et l'évolution de son conseil d'administration, la nature de son sociétariat. Nous mettons par ailleurs en exergue l'importance des mécanismes de gouvernement informels, comme les réseaux de dirigeants et la culture d'entreprise, dans les stratégies de rapprochement initiées par le groupe.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabrice Roth, 2000. "Gouvernement des entreprises et stratégie du dirigeant:une étude clinique dans le secteur de l'assurance," Working Papers CREGO 1000701, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    • Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1000701
    Note: article publié dans Finance Contrôle Stratégie, vol.3, n°4, décembre 2000,p.179-199.
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Fabrice Roth, 2012. "Crise et régulation des marchés financiers : Quel impact sur les formes mutuelles dans l'assurance ?," Working Papers halshs-00692342, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    gouvernement d'entreprise; assurance; discrétion managériale;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility

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