We consider an economy where property rights are necessary to ensure sufficient rewards to ex ante investments. Because enforcement of property rights influences the ex post distribution of rents there is room for corruption. We characterize the optimal organization of society and the optimal degree of property rights enforcement subject to incentive constraints of the agents.
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Length: 29 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in The Economic Journal, 108(450), 1998 Handle: RePEc:del:abcdef:96-12
Find related papers by JEL classification: D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
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