This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Tacit Collusion in Price-Setting Duopoly Markets: Experimental Evidence

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Lisa R. Anderson () (Department of Economics, College of William and Mary)
Beth A. Freeborn () (Department of Economics, College of William and Mary)
Charles A. Holt () (Department of Economics, University of Virginia)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We study the effect of demand structure on the ability of subjects to tacitly collude on prices by considering Bertrand substitutes and Bertrand complements. We find evidence of collusion in the complements treatment, but no such evidence in the substitutes treatment. This finding is somewhat in contrast with Potters and Suetens (2007) who observe tacit collusion in two treatments with similar underlying demand structures but with no market context.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://web.wm.edu/economics/wp/cwm_wp73.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, College of William and Mary in its series Working Papers with number 73.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 10 Jul 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cwm:wpaper:73

Contact details of provider:
Postal: P.O. Box 8795, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795
Phone: (757) 221-4311
Fax: (757) 221-2390
Web page: http://www.wm.edu/economics/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Beth A Freeborn).

Related research
Keywords: collusion; Bertrand; experiment;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Data contributors to RePEc receive monthly emails with details about downloads and abstract views of their works.

This page was last updated on 2009-10-20.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.