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Voting by Committees

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Author Info
Salvador Barbera (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)
Hugo Sonnenschein (University of Pennsylvania)
Lin Zhou

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Abstract

Problems of social choice frequently take the following form. There are n voters and a set K = (1,2,...,k) of objects. The voters must choose a subset of K. We define a class of voting schemes called voting by committees. The main result of the paper is a characterization of voting by committees, which is the class of all voting schemes that satisfy voter sovereignty and non-manipulability on the domain of separable preferences. This result is analogous to the literature on the Groves and Clarke scheme in that it characterizes all of the non-manipulable voting schemes on an important domain.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d09a/d0941.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 941.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: May 1990
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Publication status: Published in Econometrica (May 1991), 59(3): 595-609
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:941

Note: CFP 783.
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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Related research
Keywords: Social choice; voting; committees;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Groves, Theodore & Loeb, Martin, 1975. "Incentives and public inputs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 211-226, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Barbera, S. & Peleg, B., 1988. "Strategy-Proof Voting Schemes With Continuous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 91.88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  4. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ehud Kalai & Eitan Muller, 1977. "Characterization of Domains Admitting Nondictatorial Social Welfare Functions and Nonmanipulable Voting Procedures," Discussion Papers 234, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Barbera, S. & Sonnenschein, H., 1988. "Voting By Quota And Committee," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 95-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  7. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1979. "Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1137-44, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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