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Dynamic Auctions: A Survey

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Abstract

We survey the recent literature on designing auctions and mechanisms for dynamic settings. Two settings are considered: those with a dynamic population of agents or buyers whose private information remains fixed throughout time; and those with a fixed population of agents or buyers whose private information changes across time. Within each of these settings, we discuss both efficient (welfare-maximizing) and optimal (revenue-maximizing) mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • Dirk Bergemann & Maher Said, 2010. "Dynamic Auctions: A Survey," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1757, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1757
    Note: CFP 1325
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    Cited by:

    1. Hao Li & Xianwen Shi, 2017. "Discriminatory Information Disclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(11), pages 3363-3385, November.
    2. Deepanshu Vasal, 2022. "Master equation of discrete-time Stackelberg mean field games with multiple leaders," Papers 2209.03186, arXiv.org.
    3. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 595-612.
    4. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design," CARF F-Series CARF-F-279, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    5. Yoon, Kiho, 2015. "On budget balance of the dynamic pivot mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 206-213.
    6. Babaioff, Moshe & Blumrosen, Liad & Roth, Aaron, 2015. "Auctions with online supply," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 227-246.
    7. Kartikeya Puranam & Michael Katehakis, 2014. "On optimal bidding and inventory control in sequential procurement auctions: the multi period case," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 217(1), pages 447-462, June.
    8. Battaglini, Marco & Lamba, Rohit, 2019. "Optimal dynamic contracting: the first-order approach and beyond," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.
    9. Liu, Heng, 2018. "Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
    10. Daniel F. Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2012. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(5), pages 879-925.
    11. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2011. "Efficient Combinatorial Exchanges," CARF F-Series CARF-F-258, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    12. Deepanshu Vasal & Randall Berry, 2022. "Master Equation for Discrete-Time Stackelberg Mean Field Games with single leader," Papers 2201.05959, arXiv.org.
    13. Kiho Yoon, 2015. "On the Uniqueness of Dynamic Groves Mechanisms," Discussion Paper Series 1505, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
    14. Katehakis, Michael N. & Puranam, Kartikeya S., 2012. "On bidding for a fixed number of items in a sequence of auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 222(1), pages 76-84.
    15. Santiago R. Balseiro & Omar Besbes & Gabriel Y. Weintraub, 2012. "Auctions for Online Display Advertising Exchanges: Approximations and Design," Working Papers 12-11, NET Institute.
    16. Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic, 2017. "Repeated Nash implementation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dynamic auctions and mechanisms; Random arrivals and departures; Changing private information; Incentive compatibility;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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