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To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises

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  • Brams, S.J.

Abstract

IN his classic novel, "Catch-22" (1961), Joseph Heller describes a thoroughly frustrating situation faced by a combat pilot in World War II. This is generalized to a "generic" 2x2 strict ordinal game, in which whatever strategy the column player chooses, the best response of the row player is to inflict on the column player a worst or next-worst outcome, and possibly vice-versa. The 12 specific games subsumed by the generic game are called catch-22 games.

Suggested Citation

  • Brams, S.J., 1998. "To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises," Working Papers 98-11, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:98-11
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mailath George J. & Samuelson Larry & Swinkels Jeroen M., 1994. "Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 325-371, December.
    2. Mailath, George J & Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M, 1993. "Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(2), pages 273-302, March.
    3. Brams, Steven J. & Jones, Christopher B., 1997. "Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games : Cycling, Frustration, and Power," Working Papers 97-23, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    4. Frank C. Zagare & D. Marc Kolgour, 1998. "Deterrence Theory and the Spiral Model Revisited," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(1), pages 59-87, January.
    5. Lester A. Zeager & Johnathan B. Bascom, 1996. "Strategic Behavior in Refugee Repatriation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 40(3), pages 460-485, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    GAMES;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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