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Childcare and Commitment within Households

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  • Paula GOBBI

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES))

Abstract

Parental time with children increases with the education of both the mother and the father. As the education of parents increases, the gap between childcare supplied by mothers relative to that supplied by fathers decreases. A two steps semi-cooperative marital decision model is proposed to explain these two facts. First, parents collectively choose the amount of labor to supply and, in a second step, each of them chooses the amount of childcare as the outcome of a Cournot game. This framework gives rise to indeterminacy of the equilibrium and four selection criteria are proposed: one of a machist society, one of a feminist society, one of a random equilibrium and a last one that estimates the degree of social gender bias towards men. The semi-cooperative theoretical frameworks with the random selection criterion and the criterion that estimates the bias towards men provide the best match with the data.

Suggested Citation

  • Paula GOBBI, 2013. "Childcare and Commitment within Households," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2013019, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:2013019
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    File URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2013019.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David de la Croix & Clara Delavallade, 2018. "Religions, Fertility, And Growth In Southeast Asia," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 907-946, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Childcare; Education; Commitment; Semi-Cooperative Model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J11 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Demographic Trends, Macroeconomic Effects, and Forecasts
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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