Nicola Lacetera (Department of Economics, Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western University, Cleveland, OH, USA) Lorenzo Zirulia (Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Italy; CESPRI, Bocconi University, Milano, Italy; and Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis)
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
Scientific fraud is a pervasive phenomenon with deleterious consequences, as it leads to false scientific knowledge being published, therefore a¤ecting major individual and public decisions. In this paper we build a game-theoretic model of the research and publication process that ana- lyzes why scientists commit fraud and how fraud can be detected and prevented. In the model, authors are asymmetrically informed about the success of their projects, and can fraudulently manipulate their results. We show four main results. First, the types of scientific frauds that are observed are unlikely to be representative of the overall amount of malfeasance in science; also, star scientists are more likely to misbehave, but are less likely to be caught than average scientists. Second, a reduction in the costs of checking for frauds may not lead to a reduction of misconduct episodes, but rather to a change in the type of research that is performed. Third, an increase in competition between scientists may in fact reduce, and not increase, scientific misconduct. Finally, a more active role of editors in checking for misconduct does not always provide additional deterrence.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESPRI, Centre for Research on Innovation and Internationalisation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy in its series CESPRI Working Papers with number
215.
Length: pages 34 Date of creation: Mar 2008 Date of revision:
Apr 2008 Handle: RePEc:cri:cespri:wp215
Contact details of provider: Postal: via Sarfatti, 25 - 20136 Milano - Italy Phone: +39.025836.3397 Fax: +39.025836.3399 Web page: http://www.cespri.unibocconi.it/
Order Information: Postal: E G E A - via R. Sarfatti, 25 - 20136 Milano -Italy
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Roberta Ometti).
Find related papers by JEL classification: A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks Economic Anthropology
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: