This paper assesses the costs and benefits of monetary union in Europe. It is argued that neither the costs nor the benefits are in principle likely to be as great as critics and proponents respectively have suggested. Fiscal issues are, it is argued, likely to be far more significant. Fiscal federalism is by no means a necessary corollary of monetary union and the `Maastricht rules' on public debt and deficits will place harmful constraints on national fiscal policies. Finally the Community's Structural Funds are unlikely to be the most efficient way of redistributing resources between member states.
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
722.
Find related papers by JEL classification: E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
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