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Dynamic Merger Review

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Author Info
Nocke, Volker
Whinston, Michael

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Abstract

We analyze the optimal dynamic policy of an antitrust authority towards horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and occur over time. Approving a currently proposed merger will affect the profitability and welfare effects of potential future mergers, the characteristics of which may not yet be known to the antitrust authority. We show that, in many cases, this apparently difficult problem has a simple resolution: an antitrust authority can maximize discounted consumer surplus by using a completely myopic merger review policy that approves a merger today if and only if it does not lower consumer surplus given the current market structure.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 7077.

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Date of creation: Dec 2008
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7077

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Related research
Keywords: efficiency gain; horizontal merger; market power; merger policy; oligopoly;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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  1. Boyan Jovanovic & Peter L. Rousseau, 2002. "The Q-Theory of Mergers," NBER Working Papers 8740, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Massimo MOTTA & Helder VASCONCELOS, 2003. "Efficiency Gains and Myopic Antitrust Authority in a Dynamic Merger Game," Economics Working Papers ECO2003/23, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Ramon Fauli-Oller, 2000. "Takeover Waves," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 9(3), pages 189-210, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Martin Pesendorfer, 2005. "Mergers Under Entry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(3), pages 661-679, Autumn.
  5. Ramon Fauli-Oller, 2000. "Takeover Waves," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 9(2), pages 189-210, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Boyan Jovanovic & Peter L. Rousseau, 2002. "Mergers as Reallocation," NBER Working Papers 9279, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-26, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Nilssen, T. & Sorgard, L., 1995. "Sequential Horizontal Mergers," Memorandum 30/1995, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
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  9. Matsushima, Noriaki, 2001. "Horizontal Mergers and Merger Waves in a Location Model," Australian Economic Papers, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(3), pages 263-86, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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