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Minorities and Storable Votes

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Author Info
Casella, Alessandra
Palfrey, Thomas R
Riezman, Raymond

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Abstract

The paper studies a simple voting system that has the potential to increase the power of minorities without sacrificing aggregate efficiency. Storable votes grant each voter a stock of votes to spend as desired over a series of binary decisions. By cumulating votes on issues that it deems most important, the minority can win occasionally. But because the majority typically can outvote it, the minority wins only if its strength of preferences is high and the majority's strength of preferences is low. The result is that aggregate efficiency either falls slightly or in fact rises. The theoretical predictions are confirmed by a series of experiments: the frequency of minority victories, the relative payoff of the minority versus the majority, and the aggregate payoffs all match the theory.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 5278.

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Date of creation: Oct 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5278

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Related research
Keywords: experiments; minorities; tyranny of the majority; voting;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
K19 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Other

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Dirk Engelmann & Veronika Grimm, 2006. "Overcoming Incentive Constraints? The (In-)effectiveness of Social Interaction," Working Paper Series in Economics 22, University of Cologne, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Paul Milgrom & Robert Weber, 1981. "Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 428R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  3. Rafael Hortala-Vallve, 2007. "Qualitative Voting," Economics Series Working Papers 320, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Casella, Alessandra, 2005. "Storable votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 391-419, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Alessandra Casella & Andrew Gelman & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2003. "An Experimental Study of Storable Votes," NBER Working Papers 9982, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Esteban Klor & Eyal Winter, 2007. "The welfare effects of public opinion polls," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 379-394, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Alessandra Casella, 2008. "Storable Votes and Agenda Order Control Theories and Experiments," Discussion Papers 0809-07, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Alessandra Casella, 2008. "Storable Votes and Agenda Order Control. Theory and Experiments," NBER Working Papers 14487, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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