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Regulation Games

Author

Listed:
  • Gilbert, Richard
  • Newbery, David M G

Abstract

We examine regulation as a repeated game between a regulator and a utility facing a Markovian sequence of demands. Sunk capital would be expropriated by a regulator concerned only with the short-run interests of consumers. There exist rate of return regulatory policies supporting efficient investment paths with zero expected profits as subgame perfect Nash equilibria, but these policies must under-reward capital in some states of the world. Carefully designed nonlinear price regulation can improve on these equilibrium outcomes, although at higher consumer costs, and only if state-contingent transfers are feasible.

Suggested Citation

  • Gilbert, Richard & Newbery, David M G, 1988. "Regulation Games," CEPR Discussion Papers 267, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:267
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Eduardo Saavedra, "undated". "Opportunistic Behavior and Legal Disputes in the Chilean Electricity Sector," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv130, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
    2. Severin Boreinstein & Andrea Shepard, 1996. "Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(3), pages 429-451, Autumn.
    3. Flacher, David & Jennequin, Hugues & Lorenzi, Jean-Hervé, 2006. "Innovation, Investment and Regulation: What are the Options for Regulation in the Near Future?," MPRA Paper 3573, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Jean-Jacques Laffont, 2004. "Management of Public Utilities in China," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 5(2), pages 185-210, November.
    5. Toru Hattori & Jamasb, T. & Pollitt, M.G., 2002. "Relative Performance of UK and Japanese Electricity Distribution Systems 1985-1998: Lessons for Incentive Regulation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0212, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    6. Giuliana Palumbo, 2000. "Decision Rules and Optimal Delegation of Information Acquisition," CSEF Working Papers 42, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    7. Yin-Fang Zhang & David Parker & Colin Kirkpatrick, 2008. "Electricity sector reform in developing countries: an econometric assessment of the effects of privatization, competition and regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 159-178, April.
    8. J.A. den Hertog, 2010. "Review of economic theories of regulation," Working Papers 10-18, Utrecht School of Economics.
    9. repec:cam:camdae:1324 is not listed on IDEAS

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