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The Inner Workings of the Board: Evidence from Emerging Markets

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  • Ferreira, Daniel
  • De Haas, Ralph
  • Kirchmaier, Tom

Abstract

We survey non-executive directors in emerging markets to obtain detailed information about the inner workings of corporate boards across a variety of institutional settings. We document substantial variation in the structure and conduct of boards as well as in directors’ perceptions about the local legal environment. Further analysis indicates that directors who feel adequately empowered by local legislation are less likely to actively vote against board proposals. They also form boards that play a stronger role in the company’s strategic decision-making. This suggests that a supportive legal environment allows directors to focus more on their advisory, as opposed to their monitoring, role.

Suggested Citation

  • Ferreira, Daniel & De Haas, Ralph & Kirchmaier, Tom, 2017. "The Inner Workings of the Board: Evidence from Emerging Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 12317, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12317
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    Cited by:

    1. Anton, Sorin Gabriel & Nucu, Anca Elena Afloarei, 2022. "On the role of institutional factors in shaping working capital management policies: Empirical evidence from European listed firms," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 46(2).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Boards of directors; Corporate governance; Emerging markets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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