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The political economy of protection of some “sensitive” agricultural products in Colombia

Author

Listed:
  • María Angélica Arbeláez
  • Sebastián Higuera
  • Roberto Steiner
  • Sandra Zuluaga

Abstract

Como parte de una amplia agenda de reformas estructurales, a comienzos de los anos noventa Colombia emprendió un importante programa de liberalización comercial, enfocado principalmente en la reducción de aranceles. En las dos últimas décadas el uso extendido de barreras no arancelarias y de otras medidas de protección han reversado parcialmente el esfuerzo de liberalización, en particular para algunos productos agrícolas considerados sensibles. Colombia también se destaca como el único país de América Latina en el que la agricultura tuvo un desempeno mediocre durante la década de precios altos de los productos básicos, con una política sectorial enfocada más en la protección que en la provisión de bienes públicos. Esto es particularmente preocupante en el contexto del Acuerdo de Paz con las FARC el cual requiere, para ser sostenible, un sector agrícola competitivo y de rápido crecimiento. Por supuesto, la política comercial no ocurre en el vacío, sino que es, más bien, el resultado de complejas interacciones políticas entre diversos grupos de interés. Para arrojar luz sobre la economía política de la protección de los productos agrícolas sensibles en Colombia, en este documento analizamos los casos de arroz y azúcar. Ambos están fuertemente protegidos, pesan mucho en las canastas de consumo de los hogares y forman parte de complejas cadenas de valor agregado. El análisis de fuentes secundarias y de más de 20 entrevistas semiestructuradas nos permite entender mejor el “por qué” de la protección comercial. Identificamos ganadores y perdedores y discutimos los canales de influencia de jugadores claves, incluyendo a los productores agrícolas y sus organizaciones, la industria procesadora de alimentos, grandes conglomerados económicos, el Congreso, los medios de comunicación y algunos ministerios altamente politizados. También discutimos los mecanismos de compensación utilizados en los pocos episodios de liberalización que se han llevado a cabo, incluyendo especialmente el TLC con EE. UU. Mostramos que los productores agrícolas están bien organizados, apoyados por grupos de presión como las “Dignidades”, y tienen más peso político que millones de consumidores dispersos y que la industria procesadora.

Suggested Citation

  • María Angélica Arbeláez & Sebastián Higuera & Roberto Steiner & Sandra Zuluaga, 2019. "The political economy of protection of some “sensitive” agricultural products in Colombia," Informes de Investigación 17195, Fedesarrollo.
  • Handle: RePEc:col:000124:017195
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11445/3718
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Colombia; Protección Comercial; Agricultura; Economía Política;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
    • Q1 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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