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Who Should Act as a Lender of Last Resort? An Incomplete Contracts Model

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  • Rafael Repullo

Abstract

This paper presents a model of a bank subject to liquidity shocks that require borrowing from a lender of last resort. Two government agencies with different objectives may perform this function: a central bank and a deposit insurance corporation. Both agencies supervise the bank, i.e. collect nonverifiable information about its financial condition, and use this information to decide whether to support it. It is shown that the optimal institutional design involves the two agencies: the central bank being responsible for dealing with small liquidity shocks, and the deposit insurance corporation for large shocks. Furthermore, except for very small shocks, they should lend at penalty rates.

Suggested Citation

  • Rafael Repullo, 1999. "Who Should Act as a Lender of Last Resort? An Incomplete Contracts Model," Working Papers wp1999_9913, CEMFI.
  • Handle: RePEc:cmf:wpaper:wp1999_9913
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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