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Agriculture in Development: A Coalitional Analysis

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  • Bates, Robert H.
  • Rogerson, William P.

Abstract

In interpreting these results, we can make use of several characteristics of the economies of the developing nations. The first is that consumers in poor nations spend a very large portion of their incomes on food — in many cases, in excess of 50 to 60 percent. The second is that specialization in the developing economies appears to have proceeded much further in the ‘modern sector’ — i.e. in manufacturing — than it has in agriculture. Thus, in the manufacturing sector, there are firms which specialize in the production of such items as clothing, bicycles, soap, and toothpaste; but in agriculture, ‘firms’ often amount to peasant farmers who grow a full range of crops with which to meet their subsistence needs and who simply market their surplus production. In other words, agricultural producers supply ‘food’ as opposed to ‘wheat,’ ‘lettuce,’ ‘tomatoes,’ or what not. In terms of our model, these considerations imply that agricultural producers can be assigned very high ‘α's.’ In the process of coalition formation, they therefore constitute relatively unattractive partners; for should they be granted a price rise, this would be very costly to all other members of the coalition. Persons seeking to influence the state so as to secure higher real incomes therefore have a strong incentive to exclude agricultural producers from the policy determining coalitions in preference to other partners who possess lower ‘α's.’ Under such circumstances, our model suggests, an equilibrium coalition does exist and food producers are unlikely to be members of it. Such a coalition would maximize the level of the guaranteed income of all prospective members; it would represent the best possible outcome of their search for lobbying partners, and there are therefore strong incentives for it to form. Moreover, our model suggests that such a coalition would be composed of persons who draw their incomes from the production of goods characterized by the lower range of ‘α's, i.e., by ‘α's’ which
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Suggested Citation

  • Bates, Robert H. & Rogerson, William P., "undated". "Agriculture in Development: A Coalitional Analysis," Working Papers 263, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:263
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    Cited by:

    1. Hagedorn, K, 1990. "The Impact of Institutional Particularities on Agricultural Policy," 1990 Symposium, Agricultural Restructuring in Southern Africa, July 24-27, 1990, Swakopmund, Namibia 183500, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    2. Fertő, Imre, 1998. "Az agrárpolitika politikai gazdaságtana II. Az agrárpolitikák magyarázata [The political economy of agrarian policy. Part II. Explanation of the agrarian policies]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(4), pages 297-316.
    3. James Buchanan & Dwight Lee, 1991. "Cartels, coalitions, and constitutional politics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 139-161, March.
    4. Mick Moore, 1990. "The Rational Choice Paradigm and the Allocation of Agricultural Development Resources," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 21(2), pages 225-246, April.
    5. Grant D. Forsyth, 2006. "Special Interest Protectionism and the Antebellum Woolen Textile Industry," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(5), pages 1025-1058, November.
    6. Alsop, Ruth, 1998. "Coalitions and the organization of multiple-stakeholder action: a case study of agricultural research and extension in Rajasthan, India," EPTD discussion papers 34, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    7. Bates, Robert H. & Block, Steven A., 2009. "Political Economy of Agricultural Trade Interventions in Africa," Agricultural Distortions Working Paper Series 50302, World Bank.

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