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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Penn CARESS Working Papers with number f0f956747161c96ffb6e79d05b4794b1.

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Handle: RePEc:cla:penntw:f0f956747161c96ffb6e79d05b4794b1

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1. Moldovanu, Benny, 1992. "Coalition-proof nash equilibria and the core in three-player games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 565-581, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Bhaskar Dutta & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 1993. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(2), pages 463-77, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Gul, Faruk, 1989. "Bargaining Foundations of Shapley Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 81-95, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 286-336, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1996. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure," Papers 68, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
   • Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1996. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure," Papers 0068, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
   • Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1998. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Working Papers 98-1, Brown University, Department of Economics, revised Jan 1998.
5. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996. "Bargaining and Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 357-80, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1994. "Bargaining and Value," Economics Working Papers 114, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Feb 1995. [Downloadable!]
6. Sutton, John, 1986. "Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(5), pages 709-24, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Armando Gomes & Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1997. "Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field," Game Theory and Information 9705003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Armando Gomes & Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1997. "Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field," Economics Working Papers 241, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
   • Gomes, Armando & Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1999. "Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 204-228, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Working papers 495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
11. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Krishna, Vijay & Serrano, Roberto, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1993. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Papers 21, Boston University - Department of Economics.
15. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
16. Bennett, Elaine, 1997. "Multilateral Bargaining Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 151-179, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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