Informational Size, Incentive Compatibility and the Core of a Game with Incomplete Information

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Informational Size, Incentive Compatibility and the Core of a Game with Incomplete Information

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Richard P. McLean
Andrew Postlewaite

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Andrew Postlewaite

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Penn CARESS Working Papers with number b52ac626d6631b39913783700317fc3a.

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Date of creation: Feb 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cla:penntw:b52ac626d6631b39913783700317fc3a

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Article
- McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2003. "Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 222-241, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2003. "Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-027, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- McLean, Richard & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2005. "Core convergence with asymmetric information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 58-78, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects," Working Papers 2001-01, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Forges, F. & Mertens, J.-F. & Vohra, R., 2001. "The Ex Ante incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects," Papers 0101, Universite catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics (CORE).
- Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1865-1892, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 1-41, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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