1. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 238, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
2. Hansen, Gary D., 1985. "Indivisible labor and the business cycle," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 309-327, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Eiichi Miyagawa & Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2003. "Repeated Games with Observation Costs," Discussion Papers 0203-14, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Eiichi Miyagawa & Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2003. "Repeated Games with Observation Costs," KIER Working Papers 565, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
2. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000865, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2051, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Takahashi, Satoru, 2007. "Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 27-49, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Less is more: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000342, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Gamess," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-246, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
   • Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 475-493, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (with M. Kandori)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 275, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
5. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 699152000000000028, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(2), pages 173-192, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Michihiro Kandori, 1999. "Check Your Partners' Behavior by Randomization: New Efficiency Results on Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-45, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
7. Osório-Costa, António M., 2009. "Efficiency Gains in Repeated Games at Random Moments in Time," MPRA Paper 13105, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 03 Feb 2009. [Downloadable!]
8. Robert Gazzale, 2005. "Giving Gossips Their Due: Information Provision in Games with Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 0508002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
9. Jeffery Ely & Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2003. "Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit," Discussion Papers 1381, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
10. Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Folk Theorem with Communication," UCLA Economics Online Papers 366, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Ichiro Obara, 2007. "Folk Theorem with Communication," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000351, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
11. Michihiro Kandori, 2001. "Randomization, Communication and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-139, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
12. Ichiro Obara, 2000. "Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1449, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
13. Dellarocas, Chrysanthos, 2003. "Efficiency and Robustness of Binary Feedback Mechanisms in Trading Environments with Moral Hazard," Working papers 4297-03, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
14. Harrison Cheng, 2000. "Folk Theorem with One-sided Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 338-363, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Eiichi Miyagawa & Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2004. "The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs," Discussion Papers 0405-12, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Eiichi Miyagawa & Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2004. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs," KIER Working Papers 597, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
16. Mouraviev, Igor, 2006. "Private Observation, Tacit Collusion and Collusion with Communication," Working Paper Series 672, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]