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Buyer Coalition Against Monopolistic Screening: On the Role of Asymmetric Information among Buyers

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  • Doh-Shin Jeon
  • Domenico Menicucci

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  • Doh-Shin Jeon & Domenico Menicucci, 2002. "Buyer Coalition Against Monopolistic Screening: On the Role of Asymmetric Information among Buyers," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000025, David K. Levine.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000025
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    1. Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "The Logic of Vertical Restraints," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 921-939, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Csorba, Gergely, 2008. "Screening contracts in the presence of positive network effects," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 213-226, January.

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