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Edgar Allen Poe's Riddle: Do Guessers Outperform Misleaders in a Repeated Matching Pennies Game?

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  • Kfir Eliaz
  • Ariel Rubinstein

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  • Kfir Eliaz & Ariel Rubinstein, 2008. "Edgar Allen Poe's Riddle: Do Guessers Outperform Misleaders in a Repeated Matching Pennies Game?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001909, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001909
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    1. Wooders, John & Shachat, Jason M., 2001. "On the Irrelevance of Risk Attitudes in Repeated Two-Outcome Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 342-363, February.
    2. Ben-Porath Elchanan, 1993. "Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 17-32, February.
    3. Cooper, Russell & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Thomas W. Ross, 1993. "Forward Induction in the Battle-of-the-Sexes Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1303-1316, December.
    4. Mookherjee Dilip & Sopher Barry, 1994. "Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 62-91, July.
    5. Yaakov Kaarev & Werner G³th & Hartmut Kliemt, 2005. "How to Play Randomly without a Random Generator: The Case of Maximin Players," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 22, pages 231-255.
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