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Is Emulation Good for You? The Ups and Downs of Rivalry

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Author Info
Daniel Léonard
Ngo Van Long ()

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Abstract

We model the emulation between two athletes whose goals are fixed by their coaches. The coaches in turn engage in a game of goal setting. We analyze the equilibriums of that game. For some range of parameter values, there are only mixed equilibriums, where one coach randomizes his goals while the other coach uses a pure strategy. We show that it is in an athlete’s interest to have a stronger rival. Both athletes can gain if there is not a big gap between their ability levels. A very big gap, however, result in poorer performance of both.

Nous étudions un phénomène d’émulation entre deux athlètes pour qui des objectifs sont axés par leur entraîneur. Cela conduit à un jeu stratégique entre les entraîneurs qui aboutit à un équilibre de Nash. Pour certaines valeurs des paramètres l’un joue une stratégie mixte tandis que l’autre joue une stratégie pure. On montre qu’il est très utile pour une athlète de se confronter à une autre athlète plus forte. Cela améliore la performance des deux. Si l’écart est trop grand, les conséquences sont très mauvaises pour les deux. Le vieil adage « Qui se ressemble s’assemble » se trouve validé.

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Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 2008s-02.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 2008
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Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2008s-02

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Related research
Keywords: Emulation Goal Setting Émulation

Find related papers by JEL classification:
I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kaufman, Bruce E., 1999. "Emotional arousal as a source of bounded rationality," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 135-144, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Damon Clark, 2007. "Selective Schools and Academic Achievement," IZA Discussion Papers 3182, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  4. James D. Dana, 2005. "Strategic Differentiation And Strategic Emulation In Games With Uncertainty," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(3), pages 417-432, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Tor Eriksson & Anders Poulsen & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2008. "Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 0812, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
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