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Is Emulation Good for You? The Ups and Downs of Rivalry

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  • Daniel Léonard
  • Ngo Van Long

Abstract

We introduce the notion of emulation that accounts for the effect of another participant's goals on the probability of success of an individual in the context of a sporting contest. The individual not only chooses her effort to maximize utility, but also reacts to the goals set by her own coach and the coach of another individual. We analyse the game of goal setting between two coaches. Beginning with identically able athletes, as one athlete's ability increases, both athletes' set goals are increased but the more able one's increases faster at first. At some critical point the coach of the less able athlete shifts to a mixed strategy that pins the other coach to a single pure strategy.
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Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Léonard & Ngo Van Long, 2008. "Is Emulation Good for You? The Ups and Downs of Rivalry," CIRANO Working Papers 2008s-02, CIRANO.
    • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2008s-02
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    File URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2008s-02.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Daniel Léonard & Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2006. "A Simple Model of Performance-enhancing Goals," CIRANO Working Papers 2006s-22, CIRANO.
    2. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, March.
    3. Clark Damon, 2010. "Selective Schools and Academic Achievement," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-40, February.
    4. James D. Dana, 2005. "Strategic Differentiation And Strategic Emulation In Games With Uncertainty," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 417-432, September.
    5. Kaufman, Bruce E., 1999. "Emotional arousal as a source of bounded rationality," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 135-144, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Eriksson, Tor & Poulsen, Anders & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2009. "Feedback and incentives: Experimental evidence," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(6), pages 679-688, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Emulation; Goal Setting; Émulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact

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