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Why Do U.S. CEOs Pledge Their Own Company's Stock?

Author

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  • Kornelia Fabisik

    (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute)

Abstract

Between 2007 and 2016, 7.6% of publicly listed U.S. firms disclosed that their CEOs had pledged company stock as collateral for a loan. On average, CEOs pledge 38% of their shares. The mean loan value is an economically sizeable $65 million. CEOs use the funds to either double down (6.0%), hedge their ownership (3.5%), or to obtain liquidity while maintaining ownership (90.5%). My event study results reveal that stock market participants view pledging as value-enhancing, but perceive significant pledging as value-destroying. Similarly, I find no evidence of its negative shareholder value consequences, except for CEOs who engage in significant pledging.

Suggested Citation

  • Kornelia Fabisik, 2019. "Why Do U.S. CEOs Pledge Their Own Company's Stock?," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 19-60, Swiss Finance Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp1960
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    Cited by:

    1. McWalter, Thomas A. & Ritchken, Peter H., 2022. "On stock-based loans," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    2. Stefano Colonnello & Giuliano Curatola & Shuo Xia, 2022. "Trading Away Incentives," Working Papers 2022:16, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".

    More about this item

    Keywords

    CEO ownership; CEO incentives; pledging shares; margin loan;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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