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Electoral Competition, Accountability and Corruption:Theory and Evidence from India

Author

Listed:
  • Farzana Afridi,

    (Economics and Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi and IZA, Bonn)

  • Sourav Bhattacharya,

    (Indian Institute of Management, Kolkata)

  • Amrita Dhillon,

    (Department of Political Economy, Kings College, London, and CAGE, University of Warwick)

  • Eilon Solan,

    (School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University)

Abstract

In developing countries with weak enforcement institutions, there is implicitly a large reliance on electoral incentives to reduce corruption. However electoral discipline works well only under some conditions. In this paper we study the effect of electoral competition on corruption when uncertainty in elections is high (or accountability is low), as in many developing countries . Our theory focuses on the case of high uncertainty and shows that in this case there is a U-shaped relationship between electoral competition and corruption. We illustrate the predictions of the model with village level data on audit detected irregularities and electoral competition from India.

Suggested Citation

  • Farzana Afridi, & Sourav Bhattacharya, & Amrita Dhillon, & Eilon Solan,, 2021. "Electoral Competition, Accountability and Corruption:Theory and Evidence from India," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 569, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cge:wacage:569
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paul Niehaus & Sandip Sukhtankar, 2013. "Corruption Dynamics: The Golden Goose Effect," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 230-269, November.
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    4. Aidt, T. & Golden, M. A. & Tiwari, D., 2011. "Incumbents and Criminals in the Indian National Legislature," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1157, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
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    Cited by:

    1. Afridi, Farzana & Dhillon, Amrita & Roy Chaudhuri, Arka & Saattvic,, 2022. "Measuring performance: Ranking state success over two decades in India," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Electoral Competition; Uncertainty; Audit; Accountability JEL Classification: D72; D82; H75; O43; C72.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

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