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Un modelo integrado de depredación y colusión

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  • Germán Coloma

Abstract

Este trabajo presenta un modelo de depredación bajo condiciones de información completa y lo integra con un modelo de colusión. La competencia, la colusión y la depredación son estrategias alternativas de las dos empresas que se incluyen en el modelo. Las conclusiones básicas son que hay depredación cuando una empresa tiene un factor de descuento alto y la otra tiene un factor de descuento bajo, que hay competencia cuando ambas empresas tienen factores de descuento bajos, y que, cuando ambas empresas tienen factores de descuento altos, los equilibrios son múltiples y el juego puede transformarse en una guerra de desgaste. La colusión también puede sostenerse como un equilibrio de Nash en ciertos casos, pero los factores de descuento requeridos tienen un límite inferior y un límite superior.

Suggested Citation

  • Germán Coloma, 2001. "Un modelo integrado de depredación y colusión," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 200, Universidad del CEMA.
  • Handle: RePEc:cem:doctra:200
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Depredación; Colusión; Competencia; Guerra de desgaste; Equilibrio de Nash; Factores de descuento.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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