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Network Size and Network Capture Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Gerard Llobet () (CEMFI)
Michael Manove () (Boston University, Department of Economics)
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Most types of networks, over time, spawn the creation of complementary stocks that enhance network value. Computer operating systems, for example, induce the development of the comple- mentary stock of software applications that increase the value of the operating system. In this paper, we challenge the conventional wisdom that a large network, which induces the creation of large complementary stocks, serves as a barrier to entry that protects the incumbent from competi- tion or network capture. We show that a larger network may either deter or attract entry depending on the relation between the network quality and the cost of an innovator?s network product. The probability of entry also depends on the level of compatibility between the potential entrant?s technology and existing complementary stocks, which in turn is in?uenced by the strength of the intellectual-property-rights environment. Intellectual property rights and the associated threat of entry may a¤ect an incumbent?s choice of network size in counterintuitive ways.
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Paper provided by Boston University - Department of Economics in its series Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number
WP2006-007.
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Length: 27pages
Date of creation: Feb 2006Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2006-007Contact details of provider: Postal: 270 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215 Phone: 617-353-4389 Fax: 617-353-444 Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/ More information through EDIRC
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Find related papers by JEL classification: L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Intellectual Property Rights
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Jiawei Chen & Ulrich Doraszelski & Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., 2008.
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"Flat Tax Reforms In The U.S.: A Boon For The Income Poor ,"
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