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How Responsive are Private Transfers to Income? Evidence from a Laissez-Faire Economy

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Author Info
Donald Cox () (Boston College)
Bruce E. Hansen (University of Wisconsin)
Emmanuel Jimenez (World Bank)

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Abstract

In recent years there has been rapidly growing interest in the implications of altruistic preferences for economic behavior. Undoubtedly most of this interest is fueled by altruism's often pivotal role in economic models and policy issues. Yet there is also an emerging consensus that empirical evidence for altruistic preferences--as specified in the seminal models of Becker and Barro- -is lacking, at least for the United States. The failure to find strong evidence for altruism flies in the face of what seems to be an eminently commonsensical proposition about behavior. A possible reason for the lack of evidence for altruism in a developed country like the United States is that its substantial public transfers may have already crowded out private ones to a large extent, rendering the remaining small samples uninformative about altruism. In this paper we focus on a country with extremely limited public income redistribution, the Philippines. We examine a model that nests the Becker-Barro model of altruism and predicts that the relationship between private transfers and pre-private-transfer income will be non-linear, taking the form of a spline. We estimate this model by non-linear least squares, treating the threshold (knot point) as an unknown parameter, using recently developed econometric techniques. This allows a rigorous econometric test of the altruism hypothesis. We find that private transfers are widespread, highly responsive to household economic status and conform to patterns implied by altruistic utility interdependence. In particular, among the poorest households, we estimate that decreases in pre-private- transfer income would prompt large increases in private transfers. Our findings have significant policy implications, because they imply that attempts to improve the status of the poor could be thwarted by private responses. Some of the gains from public transfers would be shared with richer households whose burden of support for their less fortunate kin is eased. So the problems that altruistic preferences create for public income redistribution, first pointed out by Becker and Barro over 20 years ago, do indeed matter empirically.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Boston College Department of Economics in its series Boston College Working Papers in Economics with number 341..

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Length: 36 pages Classification- JEL: O15, D13, D64, H23, H42, I38
Date of creation: 01 Jul 1997
Date of revision: 01 Dec 1999
Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:341

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Keywords: Private transfers; public transfers; remittances; income redistribution; altruism; risk sharing; social safety nets; spline functions; Philippines;

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References listed on IDEAS
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Lentz, Erin & Barrett, Christopher B., 2004. "Food Aid Targeting, Shocks And Private Transfers Among East African Pastoralists," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20247, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  2. Harounan Kaziango, 2004. "Motives for Household Private Transfers in Burkina Faso," Working Papers 895, Economic Growth Center, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Laura Juarez, 2007. "Altruism, Exchange and Crowding Out of Private Support to the Elderly: Evidence from a Demogrant in Mexico," Working Papers 0707, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM. [Downloadable!]
  4. Elin Halvorsen & Thor Olav Thoresen, 2008. "Parents' Desire to Make Equal Inter Vivos Transfers," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  5. Richard P.C. Brown & Eliana V. Jimenez, 2008. "Remittances and Subjective Welfare in a Mixed-Motives Model: Evidence from Fiji," Discussion Papers Series 370, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia. [Downloadable!]
  6. Tanaka, Tomomi & Camerer, Colin & Nguyen, Quang, 2009. "Measuring Norms of Redistributive Transfers: Trust Experiments and Survey Data from Vietnam," MPRA Paper 16119, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  7. Richard P.C. Brown & Eliana V. Jimenez, 2008. "A Mixed-Motives Model of Private Transfers with Subjectively-Assessed Recipient Need: Evidence from a Poor, Transfer-Dependent Economy," Discussion Papers Series 365, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia. [Downloadable!]
  8. Ravallion, Martin & Lokshin, Michael, 2005. "Who cares about relative deprivation ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3782, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  9. Santos, Paulo & Barrett, Christopher B., 2006. "Informal Insurance in the Presence of Poverty Traps: Evidence from Southern Ethiopia," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25487, International Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
  10. Shinichi Nishiyama & Kent Smetters, 2002. "Ricardian Equivalence with Incomplete Household Risk Sharing," NBER Working Papers 8851, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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